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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Petitioner,

:

v.

:

FRANK EDWARD PHARRIS,

:

Defendant-Respondent.

Case No. 900471
Priority No. 13

:

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The question posed by the State for this Court's review is
"whether the court of appeals erroneously held that State v.
Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), adopted a 'strict compliance'
test with rule 11(5), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
supersedes the 'record as a whole' test traditionally applied on
review to determine whether a guilty plea was knowingly and
voluntarily entered."

Petition at 1.

Additional questions to be considered in the event that
this Court grants the State's petition are presented in Mr. Pharris'
conditional cross-petition for a writ of certiorari to the Utah
Court of Appeals, filed separately today.
OPINION BELOW
The Court of Appeals' decision, State v. Pharris, 14143
Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), is included in Appendix 1 to
this brief.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
The Court of Appeals7 opinion was filed on September 14,
1990.

No petition for rehearing was filed.

The State's petition

for certiorari was filed on October 15, 1990. This Court's
jurisdiction is provided by Utah Code Ann. section 78-2-2(5).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Pharris entered a plea of guilty to retail theft, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section
76-6-602(1), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge,
presiding (T. 5). The trial court subsequently allowed Mr. Pharris
to withdraw the plea, but then reimposed the plea on the day of
trial (T. 11-12).

Defense counsel moved to withdraw the reimposed

plea, and the trial court denied the motion (T. 20).
Mr. Pharris appealed the conviction and sentence to the
Utah Court of Appeals, raising several issues. The Court of Appeals
reversed Mr. Pharris' conviction, reaching only one of the issues
raised, relating to the trial court's failure to comply with Utah
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in accepting Mr. Pharris' guilty
plea.

Pharris at 35. Noting that during the entry of the guilty

plea, the trial court had failed to review on the record three of
the Rule 11 requirements (waiver of right against selfincrimination, understanding of nature and elements of offense,
knowledge of potential punishment), the Court of Appeals remanded
the case to the trial court for withdrawal of the plea.
37-38.

- 2 -

Id. at

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts relating to Mr. Pharris' conviction are
adequately presented in the Court of Appeals' decision.

143 Utah

Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
REASONS FOR DENYING THE STATE'S PETITION
This Court should not exercise its certiorari jurisdiction
in this case, because the Court of Appeals7 decision is consistent
with the decisions of this Court.

This Court has previously denied

a petition for a writ of certiorari on the issue raised in the
instant petition, and has previously condoned the reasoning of the
Pharris court in a per curiam opinion.
In Pharris, the Court of Appeals carefully detailed the
case law on the entry of guilty pleas, concluding that plea hearings
after this Court#s decision in State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah
1987), would be evaluated under a test requiring strict compliance
with Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(5).

Pharris at 36-37.

Although the State argues to the contrary, see Petition at
4-9, the conclusion of the Pharris court is correct.

Plea hearings

prior to State v. Gibbons are evaluated under the "record as a
whole" test, while plea hearings after Gibbons are evaluated under
the strict compliance test.1

1

Gibbons was filed on June 30, 1987. 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah
1987). Pre-Gibbons "record as a whole" cases include State v.
Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah Ct. App.)(plea entered
February 17, 1984), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988);
Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989)(pleas at issue were
entered prior to previous appeal filed in 1986, State v. Jolivet,
(continued)
- 3 -

The State quotes language from State v. Kav, 717 P.2d 1294
(Utah 1986), in which this Court voiced a concern that a strict
compliance test for entry of guilty pleas might result in the
withdrawal of numerous pleas in cases too old to be reprosecuted.
Petition at 7-8.

This concern is no longer relevant. As the State

argued and this Court ruled in State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d 670 (Utah
1989)(per curiam), the strict compliance test is not applied
retroactively.

Hickman at 672 n.l.2

(footnote 1 continued)
712 P.2d 843, 843-844 (Utah 1986)); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d
1266, 1267 (Utah 1988)(plea entered July 28, 1986); State v.
Hickman, 779 P.2d 670, 671 (Utah 1989)(pleas entered in January of
1985). Post-Gibbons strict compliance cases include State v.
Pharris, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 37 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(according to
pages 2 and 3 of Mr. Pharris' opening brief, the pleas were entered
on August 8 and August 9 of 1989); State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv.
Rep. 26, 27 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(plea entered January 25, 1989);
State v. Smith, 777 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989)(according to page 1 of
Mr. Smith's opening brief, the plea was entered on September 15,
1987); and State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah Ct. App.
1989)(plea entered July 17, 1987).
2

In Hickman, the State argued,

Defendant cites State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309
(Utah 1987), for the proposition that the trial
judge was required to question defendant on the
record about promises or threats. Gibbons was
decided three years after defendant pled guilty.
Prior to Gibbons, this Court had always applied
the Brooks-Warner record as a whole test. This
Court should adopt the position taken by the
Court of Appeals in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756
P.2d 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), rehearing denied,
91 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (1988), cert, denied, 98
Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1988); that Gibbons represents
a clear break with the past in application of a
procedural rule and that it will not be
retroactively applied.
State's brief in Case No. 880362, at 7.

- 4 -

The relevant policy considerations supporting the Court of
Appeals' consistent application of the strict compliance test in
post-Gibbons cases are those first articulated in Gibbons: the
application of the strict compliance test will protect the
constitutional rights at stake in plea hearings, and will discourage
or expedite postconviction attacks on the pleas, by establishing a
clear appellate record demonstrating the propriety of the plea.

740

P.2d at 1314.
This Court has previously denied certiorari review of the
Court of Appeals' first interpretation of the Gibbons strict
compliance test in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct.
App., cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).3

Since that time,

the law has been applied consistently, as it was in the instant case,
CONCLUSION
Mr. Pharris requests that this Court deny the State's
petition for a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals.
Respectfully submitted this 3DTL day of October, 1990.

s.

JAMp A. VALDEZ
Attorney for Mr. Pharris

3

The State contested the accuracy of the Court of
Appeals' interpretation of Gibbons on pages 14 through 18 of its
petition for certiorari in State v. Vasilacopulos. and on page 4 of
its reply to the brief in opposition in that case.
- 5 -

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, hereby certify that ten copies of
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and four copies to the Attorney
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this
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APPENDIX 1
COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION

143 Utah Adv. Rep. 35
IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Frank Edward PHARRIS,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 890549-CA
FILED: September 14, 1990
Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat
ATTORNEYS:
James A. Valdez and Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Dan R. Larsen, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Newey.1
BILLINGS, Judge:
Defendant Frank Edward Pharris appeals
his conviction of retail theft, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §766-602(1) (1989), We vacate the conviction
and remand.
Defendant was accused of taking a VCR
from a Sears store without paying for it.
Police arrested defendant in the store parking
lot with the VCR in his possession.
Defendant's trial was set for August 8,
1989. On the day of trial, defendant agreed to
snter a guilty plea if the State would not
appose a motion that defendant be sentenced
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-6U2(l)(c) (1989), for a class A misdemeanor.
At the change of plea hearing, the trial
udge asked defendant whether he had gone
>ver his statement with his attorney, whether
le was under the influence of • drugs or
tlcohol, whether he understood the English
anguage, whether he was threatened or pronised anything other than the plea bargain
tself, and whether he was acting freely and of
lis own volition.
The judge then told defendant he was entiled to certain constitutional protections inclding the right to trial by a jury, the right to
onfront and cross-examine witnesses, the
ight to require the State to prove its case
eyond a reasonable doubt, and "other valuble constitutional rights." Defendant said he
nderstood his waiver of those rights by pieding guilty and was willing to do so.
The judge asked defendant if he had any
uestions of the court or of his attorney,
efendant resr>onded_ "No " Thp inHap acl^ri

naa aiscussea tnose penalties with him. Defendant answered, "Yes." The judge told defendant the court was not bound by the recommendations of the plea bargain and the
court could impose any sentence either concurrently or consecutively with the sentence
defendant was presently serving.
Defendant entered a plea of guilty which the
judge declared was entered voluntarily and
knowingly. Defendant waived the two-day
minimum time for sentencing and asked to be
sentenced immediately. Defense counsel asked
the court to impose sentence as a class A
misdemeanor. The prosecutor did not oppose
defense counsel's request but described defendant's extensive criminal record. The judge
denied defendant's motion to reduce the
offense one degree and sentenced defendant to
serve zero to five years concurrently with the
sentence he was presently serving.
Defendant immediately moved to withdraw
his guilty plea and asked to proceed to trial.
Defense counsel , argued that unless his client
received some concession in the sentence, it
would be a disservice to him not to go to trial.
The judge granted the motion and set trial for
the next day.
The next morning, the judge reversed his
decision granting the motion to withdraw the
guilty plea, explaining that a showing of
"good cause" was required. The judge then
gave defendant an opportunity to show good
cause as to why his plea should be withdrawn.
In response, defense counsel explained the
State had not opposed the reduction of defendant's sentence to a class A misdemeanor.
He pointed to the length of time defendant
had been incarcerated since his arrest and the
circumstances surrounding defendant's release
on another conviction and his subsequent
arrest. Defense counsel also mentioned that he
had ineffectively represented defendant by
indicating that the plea bargain had a good
chance of success. In response, the prosecutor
again outlined portions of defendant's prior
criminal record.
The judge noted he had informed defendant
before the guilty plea was entered that the
recommendations as to the sentence were not
binding on the court and defendant's disappointment with the sentence did not establish
good cause for withdrawal of the plea. The
judge ultimately reimposed the sentence.
Among other claims on appeal,2 defendant
asserts the trial judge failed to comply with
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure as required by the Utah Supreme Court
in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah
1987), when accepting his guilty plea. Defendant contends the trial court failed to inform
him of (1) his right against selfincrimination; (2) the nature and elements of

does not contend the trial court's questioning
of defendant complies with the Gibbons strict
compliance test, but rather responds that
appellate court decisions subsequent to Gibbons
have abandoned the strict compliance
standard and allow application of the prior
"record as a whole" test to determine whether
defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered
his guilty plea. The State further asserts that,
at the hearing before the trial judge, defendant
did not articulate as a ground for withdrawal
of his plea that the court failed to comply with
Rule 11 and thus defendant cannot raise this
issue for the first time on appeal.
CONSIDERING VOLUNTARINESS OF
GUILTY PLEA FOR FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL
Both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah
Court of Appeals have allowed a Rule 11
challenge to the voluntariness of a plea to be
considered for the first time on appeal. "[I]n
certain cases we may consider the failure to
comply with Rule 11(5) and Gibbons as error
sufficiently manifest and fundamental to be
first raised on appeal to this court." State v.
Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) (per curiam).3 See also State v. Gibbons,
740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987) (defendant
had not moved to withdraw guilty plea and
court remanded to the trial court to allow a
withdrawal motion while retaining jurisdiction
over the case).
The Valencia court relied on the United
States Supreme Court decision in Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), where the
Court found no error when the Alabama
Supreme Court, on its own motion, dealt with
the constitutionality of a guilty plea. Id. at
240. The Court stated that "[i]t was error,
plain on the "face of the record, for the trial
judge to accept petitioner's guilty plea without
an affirmative showing that it was intelligent
and voluntary. Id. at242. 4
.% .
ui
Although we acknowledge that the trial
jucige made a greater effort to ensure that
defendant's plea was voluntarily and knowingly given than in Valencia and Boykin',
because of the fundamental rights involved,
we conclude the trial court's deficiencies in
determining whether the guilty plea was
entered knowingly and voluntarily constitute
plain error.5 We therefore will address this
issue for the first time on appeal.
RULE 11
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure sets out findings a court must make
before accepting a guilty plea. Rule 11(5)
provides, in pertinent part:
The court may refuse to accept a
~i<»o ^f miilrv nr no contest, and

(b) the plea is voluntarily made;
(c) the defendant knows he has
rights against compulsory selfincrimination, to a jury trial, and to
confront and cross-examine in
open court the witnesses against
him, and that by entering the plea
he waives all of those rights;
(d) the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense
to which he is entering the plea;
that upon trial the prosecution
would have the burden of proving
each of those elements beyond a
reasonable doubt; and that the plea
is an admission of all those elements;
(e) the defendant knows the
minimum and maximum sentence
that may be imposed upon him for
each offense to which a plea is
entered, including the possibility of
the imposition of consecutive sentences;
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5).
Prior to 1987, the Utah Supreme Court d
not require strict compliance with Rule 1
The court had concluded that a guilty pi
may be upheld if "the record as a whole af
rmatively establishes that defendant enter
his plea with full knowledge and understa
ding of its consequences." Warner v. Mori
709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah 1985) (mem.); see a\
Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310, 3
(Utah 1985) (per curiam). This "record as
whole" test was later reaffirmed in State
Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (j
curiam).
In 1987, the Utah Supreme Court reject
the "record as a whole" test. In State
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), the Ut
Supreme Court announced that strict comj
ance was required under Rule 11(5) of f
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure when d
endants entered guilty pleas. Id. at 1314. In G
bons, the trial judge, in accepti
Gibbons' _ guilty plea, informed him of I
penalties for the crimes, the constitutioi
rights he waived as articulated in Rule 11, t
possible sentences for the crimes, and t
possibility that those sentences could i
concurrently or consecutively. Id. at 13
However, the trial judge failed to info
Gibbons of the elements of the crimes. Id. 1
Utah Supreme Court remanded Gibbo
appeal of his guilty plea because he had i
filed a motion to withdraw his plea, then
depriving the trial court of the opportunity
address the error, but articulated its cone
that the plea was not properly taken as de
ndant had not been adequately informed

M*V wppuiiuuny to articulate the requirements
for accepting guilty pleas. The court noted the
trial court's burden to comply with the Rule
11 requirements:
Because of the importance of
compliance with Rule 11(e) [new
Rule 11(5)] and Boykin, the law
places the burden of establishing
compliance with those requirements
on the trial judge. It is not sufficient to assume that defense attorneys make sure that their clients
fully understand the contents of the
affidavit.
The use of a sufficient affidavit
can promote efficiency, but\.an
affidavit should be only a starting
point, not an end point, in the
pleading process.
rd. at 1313.'
The court found that a "sufficient affidavit"
>hould contain the following elements: (1) a
ist of the names and the degrees of the crimes
:harged; (2) a statement of the elements of the
>ffenses; (3) a synopsis of the defendant's acts
hat establish the elements of the crimes
harged; (4) the allowable punishment for the
rimes charged and note the possibility of
onsecutive sentences for multiple crimes; (5)
be rights waived by the entry of a guilty plea;
5) the details of any plea bargain with a dislaimer that any sentencing recommendations
lay not be followed; (7) the defendant's
bility to read and understand the English
mguage; (8) the defendant's competency; and
>) the absence of any inducements to influice defendant's plea. Id. at 1313-14. The
)urt concluded that "[t]he trial judge should
\en review the statements in the affidavit with
\e defendant, question the defendant conceding his understanding of it, and fulfill the
her requirements imposed by [Rule 11] on
e record before accepting the guilty plea." Id.
1314 (emphasis added).
The Gibbons standard was acknowledged by
is court in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert, denied, 765
2d 1278 (Utah 1988), where we reiterated
* rule that:
[tjrial courts may not rely on
defense counsel or executed affidavits to satisfy the specific requirements of Rule 11(e). [Gibbons, 740
P.2d] at 1313. Rather, with or
without an affidavit or defense
counsel's advice, the trial court
must conduct an on-the-record
review with defendant of the Rule
11(e) requirements.
silacopulos, 756 P.2d at 94 (quoting Gibis, 740 P.2d at 1314)). However, in

applied the previous "record as a whole" test.
Recently in State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv.
Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), we clearly held
that the Gibbons strict compliance test is
controlling. Id. at 28.
Other opinions have likewise stated the test
for determining whether Rule 11 has been
followed is the strict compliance test articulated in Gibbons. See State v. Smith, 111 P.2d
464, 465 (Utah 1989)6; State v. Valencia, 776
P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (per
curiam)7.
The State relies on Jolivet v. Cook, 784
P.2d 1148, 1149 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110
S. Ct. 751 (1990),* and State v. Copeland, 765
P.2d 1266, 1273 (Utah 1988),* to support its
argument that the Utah Supreme Court has
retrenched to the "record as a whole" test.
However, we assume that the court applied the
"record'as a whole" test in these cases because
the guilty pleas in both cases were entered
before the Gibbons decision.10
The State also argues that this court has
retrenched to the "record as a whole" test 'as
well in State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989). However, Thurston is not on
point and the State is mistaken in its reliance
on this case. In Thurston, the defendant
argued the State had not kept its part of the
plea agreement as to the recommendation that
defendant receive probation and thus defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty
plea because of this failure. Id. at 1301. The
issue was not whether the trial court failed to
comply with Rule 11 in determining whether
the plea was knowing and voluntary. As the
court explained:
The record here establishes that
defendant was fully informed of his
rights and the consequences of his
guilty plea.
The judge, pursuant to Rule 11,
informed defendant of his rights to
trial and a g a i n s t
selfincrimination, and related to him
the potential consequences of his
guilty plea.
Id. at 1302.
In summary, we find the Gibbons strict
compliance test is applicable to this postGibbons guilty plea. In reviewing the trial
court's inquiry into the voluntariness of defendant's plea, we find the trial judge did not
review with the defendant in court on the
record three of the requirements of Rule 11.
First, the trial court did not as required by
Rule ll(5)(c) inform defendant at the time the
plea was taken that he waived his constitutional right against self-incrimination by pleading guilty to the offense. The State argues
that this information is included in the affid-

Next, the trial court maae no inquiry on wc
record concerning defendant's understanding
of the nature and elements of the offense as
required by Rule ll(5)(d). The State argues
that the nature and elements of the offense of
retail theft were explained at defendant's
preliminary hearing. However, the preliminary
hearing transcript is not before us and thus it
is impossible for us to make this determination. Again, this information is only in the
affidavit and, as we have explained, that alone
is insufficient. Failure to inform a defendant
of the nature and elements of the offense is
fatal to a guilty plea conviction. See Gibbons,
740 P.2d at 1314." See also Valencia, 776
P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Finally, the trial court failed to review the
possible punishment with defendant as required by Rule ll(5)(e). The record reflects the
following dialogue between the defendant and
the trial court on the issue of penalties:
Q [THE COURT]: Are you aware of the
possible penalties that can be imposed for a
Third Degree Felony? Has your attorney told
you what the possible penalties are?
A [DEFENDANT]: Yes.
Utah courts have found the failure to
inform a defendant of the punishments possible is fatal to a guilty plea conviction. 12 See
Smith, 111 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989) (court
reversed because record did not show defendant was informed of the minimum mandatory sentence which would be imposed); Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d at 95 (in a pre-Oibbons
plea, the court reversed after finding the defendant did not understand the possibility of
consecutive sentences). 13
Under the Gibbons strict compliance test,
before accepting the guilty plea, the trial court
must review on the record with the defendant
at the time the plea is taken the nature and
elements of the offense, the constitutional
rights articulated in Rule 11 which he waives
by pleading guilty, and the allowable penalties.
We find that the trial court failed to strictly
"comply with Rule 11 and Gibbons and thus we
vacate defendant's conviction and remand to
the trial court to allow defendant to withdraw
his guilty plea.
T

Judith M. Billings, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
Robert L. Newey, Judge
1. Robert L. Newey, Senior Juvenile Court Judge,
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-3-24(10) (1990).
2. Defendant also claims that (1) the prosecutor
failed to comply with the plea agreement; (2) the
court erred in reversing its prior order granting
withdrawal of the plea; (3) there was "good cause"
J r j
- - - - *~ ...:#u^^n«7 hie oniitv nlea; and

3. In Valencia, the defendant was asked two questions at the time the guilty plea was entered: (1)
whether defendant "understood his affidavit;" and
(2) whether his plea was "voluntary." Valencia, 116
P.2d at 1334. The court found that the guilty plea
was not entered in compliance with Rule 11(5) or
with Gibbons and summarily reversed and remanded
to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and
proceed to trial. Valencia, 116 P.2d at 1334.
4. In Boykin, there was no dialogue in the record
between the defendant and the trial judge as to the
voluntariness of the guilty plea, Boykin, 395 U.S. at
239, and the United States Supreme Court therefore
concluded that the defendant's constitutional rights
had been violated. Id. at 243.
5. The Utah Supreme Court has enunciated a twopart test for determining plain error. Sfafe v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110
5. Ct. 62 (1989). First, the error must be "plain,"
which means "from our examination of the record,
we must be able to say that it should have been
obvious to the trial court that it was committing
error." Id. at 35. Second, the error "must affect the
substantial rights of the accused, i.e., that the error
be harmful." Id. See also State v. Braun, 787 P.2d
1336, 1341 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
The defendant's guilty plea in this case was
entered after the Gibbons case was decided. Therefore, it should have been obvious to the trial judge
that strict compliance with Rule 11 was required. In
addition, defendant's substantial constitutional
rights were affected by this failure to strictly comply
with Rule 11.
6. In Smith, the Utah Supreme Court allowed the
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea because the trial
judge did not strictly comply with Rule 11. Smith,
111 P.2d at 465. The court ruled that the test for
complying with Rule 11 is the strict compliance t^st
articulated in Gibbons. Id. The court then found
that neither the plea bargain affidavit nor the trial
judge clearly communicated that defendant would
be required to serve a minimum mandatory sentence
of five years. Id.
7. In Valencia, the defendant entered his guilty plea
after the Gibbons decision. The trial judge failed to
review the contents of the affidavit with the defendant. Valencia, 776 P.2d at 1335. The court concluded that the affidavit alone could not "serve as z
mere substitute for the full and complete review or
the record by the trial court that is required by th<
rule. * Id. Since the trial judge failed to comply wit}
Rule 11, the court remanded to the trial court t<
allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. •
8. In J olivet, the Utah Supreme Court applied th<
"record as a whole" test to Jolivet's motion to wit
hdraw a guilty plea. Jolivet, 784 P.2d at 1149
While the court does not give the date Jolive
entered his guilty plea or address the fact that th
guilty plea had been entered prior to Gibbons, th
Jolivet decision was the second appeal by the defc
ndant, who had entered his guilty plea prior to th
first appeal decided in 1986, before the decision i
Gibbons. See State v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843 (Uta
1986).
9. In Copeland, the defendant argued that the tri;
court failed to explain the nature and elements c
the offense. Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1273. The cou
examined the record and found that the trial cou
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jjt use the preferred method of having the
defendant state in his o*n words his understanding
T the offense and the actions which make him
lilty of the crime," id., the court found that the
ements of the offense were clearly explained to
tfendant at the time of his arraignment and, therore, under the "record as a whole" test, the plea
as voluntary. Id. Once again, however, Copeland
tered his guilty plea before Gibbons was decided
id although the court did not articulate this as a
ason for applying the "record as a whole" test, we
sume this to be the case.
. Utah courts have refused to apply the Gibbons
ict compliance test to pve-Gibbons guilty pleas.
State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah Ct.
Dp. 1988), this court ruled that the Gibbons test
i not apply since Vasilacopulos entered his guilty
:a in 1984 before the Gibbons case was decided. Id.
94. The court ruled that since the Gibbons
;t was a "clear break with the past," it would not
applied retroactively. Id. See also State v.
ckman, 779 P.2d 670, 672 n.l (Utah 1989) (per
riam).
. The Gibbons court relied on McCarthy y.
iked States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), where the
lited States Supreme Court stated that the factual
ments of the charges must be explained so the
fendant understands those elements. Id. at 466.
e Court concluded that "[tjhere is no adequate
Dstitute for demonstrating in the record at the
je the plea is entered the defendant's understanig of the nature of the charge against him." Id.
The State argues the affidavit is sufficient to
prise defendant of the allowable sentence,
nwever, the affidavit signed by the defendant
ed "Theft, 3rd Degree, 0-5" under the notation
"Crime, Degree, and Punishment," but the affi/it did not include the term "years" following "0-
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PER CURIAM:

This matter is before the court on appellant's motion for summary reversal for manifest error, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 10.
In response, appellee filed a motion to dismiss
plaintiffs motion for summary disposition,
but did not file a response addressing the
merits of appellant's motion.
The Gibbons court stated that a judge may not
We first consider appellee's motion to
\ an affidavit to establish compliance with Rule dismiss appellant's motion. Appellee contends
that the motion was untimely based on Rule
It is not sufficient to assume that
10's requirement that a motion for summary
defense attorneys make sure that their
disposition be filed within 10 days after the
clients fully understand the contents of
docketing statement is served. Appellant's
the affidavit.
docketing statement was served on July 9,
The use of a sufficient affidavit can
1990, and her motion for summary disposition
promote efficiency, but an affidavit
was filed on July 23, 1990. Appellant contends
should be only a starting point, not an
end point, in the pleading process.
that because she served the docketing statement by mail, she was entitled to an additional
ibons, 740 P.2d at 1313.
The Utah Supreme Court's most recent opinion three days after service of the docketing statthis Gibbons issue is somewhat ambiguous. In ement in which to file a motion for summary
te v. Smith, 111 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989), the court reversal. See Utah R. App. P. 22(d). Although
nd that neither the affidavit nor the trial court this three-day mailing rule is usually applied
irly explained the possibility of a minimum when the receiving party is required or permndatory sentence to the defendant. Id. at 465. itted to act after receipt of the document, it
t court concluded: "In order for defendant's
Ity plea to be valid and in compliance with rule does not specifically exclude the present situs)(5) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure ation. It is unnecessary to rely upon the
I State v. Gibbons, the record must show that he mailing rule, however, since Utah R. App. P.
; unequivocably and clearly informed about the 2 provides this court with the flexibility to
tence that would be imposed. Such evidence does suspend the requirements of Rule 10, on its
exist either in the affidavit regarding the plea own motion, where asuspension is "[i]n the
gain or in the transcript of the guilty plea. Thus, interest of expediting a decision." Because we
: 11(e) and State v. Gibbons require the vacating conclude that the motion is clearly meritorious
defendant's cuiltv Dlea on the eround that it was

